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JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF NONSTATUTORY
"IMMUNITY GRANTS": ABROGATION
BY ANALOGY
In the federal system, the United States attorney has an almost
unlimited power to negotiate plea agreements with defendants, subject
only to the requirement that all pleas of guilty resulting therefrom be
voluntarily made.' In the process of granting immunity, however,
the power of the prosecuting attorney is severely constrained, subject
both to legislative (i.e. statutory) requirements and to judicial interpretation.2 This distinction is grounded in the recognition that "[o]nly
the strongest circumstances can justify compelling a confession of
crime,"3 and, thus, that a thorough system of safeguards is necessary to
protect a person's Fifth Amendment rights. Nonetheless, a curious
hybrid has developed in what may be called the informal prosecutorial grant of immunity. Although such "immunity" is not statutorily authorized and does not fulfill traditional statutory requirements,
there is little doubt that it is considered both common and necessary to
effective law enforcement.4
In United States v. Carter,5 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit faced the problem of the enforceability of just such a promise. In
that case, the defendant pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor charge and
incriminated himself and others on the basis of his understanding of a
prosecutor's promise of absolute immunity from future prosecutions.
The primary question raised by the facts in Carter was whether the
prosecuting attorney, on his own, should ever be allowed to make a
binding grant of full transactional immunity; and, if not, what remedies
would be available to a defendant who relied to his detriment on a
prosecutorial promise to do so. Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit
1. See text accompanying notes 15-54 infra.
2. See text accompanying notes 55-98 infra.
3. In re Bart, 304 F.2d 631, 635 (D.C. Cir. 1962); cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 317 F. Supp. 792, 796-97 (E.D. Pa. 1970). The point here is compulsion.
Although a guilty plea also involves an admission of guilt, such an admission is voluntary.
4. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JusncE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 135 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY]; WORKING PAPERS OF THE NAT'L

COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMNAL LAws 1419-20 (1970).

5.

454 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1972).
[435]
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largely ignored this question and based its decision instead on "[s]ound
reasons of public policy"; 6 thus, the court held that the promise, made
by a U.S. attorney in one district, would be binding on a U.S. attorney
in another district so long as the defendant relied on it in giving the incriminating testimony. In so deciding, the court aligned itself with the
recent trend toward judicial enforcement of prosecutorial promises
where the defendant has performed his part of the bargain and where
the promise
in question was made as an inducement for the plea of
7
guilty.
Although the result reached in the Carter case is clearly equitable,
the court's failure to address itself to the distinctions between plea bargains and immunity agreements, and its failure to confront the important issue of the prosecutor's authority to make binding grants
of immunity leads to two inevitable results: unauthorized judicial expansion of the prosecutorial powers of the U.S. attorney, and effective
emasculation of the legislative safeguards built into statutory grants of
immunity. Thus, despite the apparent fairness of the court's final
remedy, the holding of the Fourth Circuit is not legally sound in that
the reliance it places on recent plea bargaining decisions ignores the
primary questions raised by the case itself, and leads to possibly
deleterious consequences which far outweigh the favorable result. This
criticism is particularly valid in view of the fact that a more equitable
and legally precedented solution to the problem before the court could
readily have been fashioned. After a discussion of the relationship
between plea bargains and immunity agreements, and an examination
of the implications and ramifications of the decision in Carter, this
note will suggest an alternative solution more consonant with sound legal authority.
The Factual Background of Carter
In 1968, William Eugene Carter was arrested by agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C., while Carter was
attempting to sell $156,000 in stolen government checks, part of a
$250,000 purchase from the actual thief. Through an agreement with
the Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Columbia
handling the case, Carter pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor charge
of possession of stolen government property, a violation of the District
of Columbia code; in return for the reduced charge, he agreed to furnish information concerning the theft, including the identity of the principal thief. This was done, to the satisfaction of the F.B.I. agents in
charge of the case, on Carter's understanding that he would not be
6. Id. at 428.
7. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Hilliard v. Beto,
465 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972); James v. Smith, 455 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1972).
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prosecuted for any other crimes concerning the checks which he might
divulge. On the basis of information supplied by Carter, the principal
thief was arrested and convicted; Carter was placed upon one year's
probation in recognition of the extent of his cooperation.
After his conviction in the District of Columbia, Carter was arrested and convicted in the Eastern District of Virginia on ten counts of
forgery8 and conspiracy, 9 and sentenced to a total of sixteen years in
prison. The gravamen of the Virginia prosecution was the forging and
uttering of some of the original $250,000 in checks."0 The defendant appealed his conviction on the ground that the prosecution was
barred by the promise made to him in the prior District of Columbia
prosecution. The Court of Appeals agreed that Carter was entitled to
receive the benefit of his bargain and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether a promise had been made and, if so, the
scope of that promise.
The court's apparent willingness to enforce the agreement as
made raises the threshold question of the relationship between immunity agreements and plea bargains. In the abstract, there seems to be
little similarity between these two concepts. The former is a procedure whereby a person is compelled to give testimony regarding criminal activities of which he may be aware. In return, his constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination" is preserved by a guarantee of
immunity from prosecution for crimes which he might reveal. In the
plea bargaining process, a defendant, through an agreement with the
prosecuting attorney, concedes to a waiver of his right to a trial on the
merits1 2 by pleading guilty to some specific charge (or charges). In
consideration of the plea, the prosecutor confers some benefit on the defendant, generally in the form of a promise to charge the defendant
with a lesser offense than the facts actually warrant, to drop other
charges pending against him, or to recommend leniency to the judge.' 3
In practice, however, the two may coalesce, as they did in Carter,
when a prosecuting attorney allows a defendant to plead guilty to a re8. 18 U.S.C. § 495 (1970).
9. Id.§§ 2, 371 (1970).
10. There is disagreement in the majority and dissenting opinions as to the identity of the checks which were the subject of the Virginia prosecution. According to the
majority, "some of [the checks] were the object of [the] earlier prosecution . . . in the
District of Columbia." 454 F.2d at 427. Judge Boreman in his dissent, however, indicates that the checks were "other than those he was attempting to sell at the time of
his arrest in the District of Columbia" and refers to the majority's statement to the
contrary as "somewhat misleading." Id. at 429 & n.2.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. Id. amend. VI.
13. For a discussion of the types of concessions and the policies underlying them,
see D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THm DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITIHOUT

TnmL 97-98 (1966) [hereinafter cited as D. NEWMAN].
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duced charge and offers him immunity from prosecution in return for
his testimony concerning criminal activities. This practice is not uncommon, 14 but it does present special problems for the courts since
the two procedures involve essentially different considerations. It is
these differences which the Carter court failed to analyze and which
must, therefore, be examined at the outset of this note.
Judicial Treatment of Plea Bargaining
It has been estimated that as many as 95 percent of all convictions
are based on pleas of guilty, with the figure running as high as 85
percent for felony convictions.15 The bulk of these guilty pleas are the
result of negotiations between the prosecutor and the defendant, 16 and
it is not unreasonable to assume that if such bargains were not commonly offered, there would be little incentive for defendants to plead
guilty.17 Absent this high rate of guilty pleas the processes of criminal
justice would simply be unable to function; most courts could not begin
to give full trials to the myriad of cases coming before them.' s
Notwithstanding the manifest importance of the plea bargaining
system, for many years the practice was shrouded in secrecy. 9 Courts
pretended that the practice did not exist, and defendants cooperated in
sustaining this illusion for fear that judges would invalidate pleas based
on such bargains.2" The problem with such secrecy, of course, was
that it left the defendant remediless in case of a breach by the prosecuting attorney; having testified under oath to the voluntariness of his
plea, a defendant could not later claim the breach of a promise made to
him as an inducement for the plea of guilty.2
In recent years, the courts have come to realize that the defendant
14.

See

THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY,

supra note 4; WORKING
1419 (1970).

PAPERS OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS

15.
LENGE

D.

NEWMAN,

supra note 13, at 3 & n.1.

See Cortez v. United States, 337 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1964);
OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4, at 134.

16.

THE CHAL-

17. See Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957).
18. THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 4.
19. See United States v. Williams, 407 F.2d 940, 949 (4th Cir. 1969); Arnold,
Law Enforcement-An Attempt at Social Dissection, 42 YALE L.J. 1, 19 (1932).
20. Cases are numerous where a defendant denied the existence of a plea bargain, even though subsequent events showed conclusively that such an agreement had
occurred. See, e.g., Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1972); White v. Gaffney,
435 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1970); Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252 (9th Cir.
1970). For many years such a denial was sufficient to establish the voluntariness of
the plea, but a more realistic view of the situation now prevails, and a defendant's
statement that no promises were made to him is no longer conclusive. See Hilliard v.
Beto, 465 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972); Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1972).
21. See United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971); Alvereze v.
United States, 427 F.2d 1150 (5th Cir. 1970).
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must be offered more extensive protection. For this reason, and in
recognition of the vital role that guilty pleas and, thus, plea bargains

play in modem criminal trials,22 the courts have held that not only is
there nothing wrong with honest plea bargaining,2 8 but that such bargains are to be encouraged,2 4 so long as the rights of the defendant are

fully protected.25

In short, there is no longer any doubt that plea

agreements are considered "an
essential, indeed indispensable, part of
26

the administration of justice.

The "Voluntariness" Requirement-The Court's Role

The primary requirement of all pleas of guilty is that they be vol-

untarily made.2 7

The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure go even

further and require that the judge personally address the defendant to
determine that the plea is made voluntarily, with a full understanding
of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.28 There
are two main considerations which dictate that the guilty plea be
subjected to such careful scrutiny. One is that the plea of guilty involves the waiver of three fundamental constitutional guarantees: the
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the
right to confront one's accusers.29 Secondly, like the verdict of a
jury, the plea of guilty is conclusive: following such a plea, "the court
has nothing to do but give judgment and sentence."3 ° For these

reasons, it is absolutely imperative that the defendant fully understand
22. The court in State ex rel. Clancy v. Coiner succinctly and accurately formulated the issue when it stated: "In this day of crowded criminal court dockets the
speedy dispatch of litigation is essential if justice is to be done." 179 S.E.2d 726, 733
(W. Va. 1971).
23. United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle, 466 F.2d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1972).
24. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
25. Kemp v. Snow, 464 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1972); see Parrish v. Beto, 414 F.2d
770 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1026 (1970).
26.

ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDs FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS

TO THE PROSECUTON FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION 102-03

RELATING

(Tent. Draft
1970); see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); cf. Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (referring to the importance of guilty pleas in general).
27. See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927).
28. FEn. R. CGuM. P. 11. The rule requires not only that the judge personally
address the defendant as to voluntariness, but also that he determine that there is a
factual basis for the plea. Id. In McCarthy v. United States, the Court held that a
plea of guilty made without such a determination is invalid and entitles the defendant
to a new hearing at which he may plead anew. 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
29. McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); accord, Boykin v.
Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (dealing with the voluntariness determination in the
state courts).
30. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927); see United States v.
Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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31 and the safeguards embodied in Rule
what his plea entails;
11 en32
sure that he will.

It was reliance upon this principle of voluntariness which first enabled the courts to deal effectively with the problem of the enforceability of plea bargains. Not wanting to eliminate the practice altogether, yet aware of the potential for abuse inherent in the nature of
plea bargaining, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Machibroda
v. United States33 that "[a] guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats
34
which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void.
Hence, any conviction based on such a plea was likewise void and subject to collateral attack."
This does not mean, of course, that all
pleas of guilty based on promises by the prosecuting attorney are invalid. " ' As long as the agreement is fairly secured, and the rights of
the accused protected, the plea bargain will be upheld. 7
The difficulty arises in determining when a promise made by a
prosecutor renders the defendant's plea involuntary. In general, the
test has been whether the prosecutor's promise has been fulfilled; when
it has not, the plea has been considered improperly induced.38 Thus,
when a plea of guilty "rests in any significant degree" on a bargain or
promise made by the prosecuting attorney to the defendant "so that it
can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration" for the
plea, 39 the defendant is entitled to relief if the government reneges on its
part of the agreement.4 0 The most common form of relief is to allow
the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea,41 a remedy which is clearly
31. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
In McCarthy v.
United States, the Court reasoned that since the waiver of constitutional rights must be
voluntarily and intelligently made to be valid under the due process clause, a guilty
plea, which involves the waiver of three such rights, must be equally voluntary and
knowing. If not, it has been obtained in violation of due process considerations and
is void. 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); accord, Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43
(1969).
32. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969).
33. 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
34. Id. at 493.
35. Id.

36. See Lupo v. United States, 435 F.2d 519, 525 (8th Cir. 1970); Cooper v.
Holman, 356 F.2d 82, 85 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 855 (1966).
37. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); Brady v. United

States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970).
38. See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962). See D. NEWMAN,
supra note 13, at 36, however, which states that such reasoning is "misleading."
39. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
40. Gallegos v. United States, 466 F2d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 1972); see Santobello
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
41. See, e.g., Schoultz v. Hocker, 469 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1972); Hilliard v. Beto,
465 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1972).
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sanctioned by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 42 The significance of this remedy lies in the fact that the relief afforded is complete: after withdrawal of the plea, the defendant is allowed to replead
and proceed to a trial on the merits. 43 His earlier plea is not allowed
as evidence at trial,44 and the defendant is left in a virtually unprejudiced position.
The Prosecution Function
Even though it is within the ambit of the powers of the court to
administer relief to a defendant once the breach of a plea bargain is
proved, the authority to strike such bargains originally rests solely with
the prosecuting attorney. At the federal level, this power derives from
the statute which vests authority in the U.S. attorney to prosecute all
offenses against the United States.4 5 Significantly, however, he is not
bound to prosecute all such offenses; rather, a qualified duty is imposed upon him, and he is vested with broad discretion to determine
whether there shall be a prosecution and, if so, on what charges. 46
In making his determination, the prosecutor is able to consider all relevant factors; if one such factor is the willingness of the defendant to
plead guilty in return for some concession, the plea bargain is born.
In exercising his discretionary power, the U.S. attorney is acting
as an officer of the executive branch of government, 47 and the doctrine
of separation of powers precludes the courts from interfering in any
way with his decision. 48 In fact, the judge is specifically prohibited
from entering into the process of plea bargaining:
When a judge becomes a participant in plea bargaining he brings
to bear the full force and majesty of his office. . . . Intentionally or otherwise, and no matter how well motivated the judge
42. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure even allow withdrawal of
the guilty plea after sentencing in order to avoid "manifest injustice." FED. R.
Calm. P.32(d).
43. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927); cf. Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
44. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220 (1927). See also Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence, rule 410; ABA PROJEcr ON MImMum STANDARDS OF CRImiNAL
Jus'cE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GuILTY § 2.2 (Approved Draft 1968)
[hereinafter cited as STANDAiDS RELATImG TO PLEAS OF GuILTY]. A full treatment of
the subject of admissibility of withdrawn guilty pleas is found in Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d
326 (1962).
45. 28 U.S.C. § 547 (1970).
46. Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 713 (4th Cir. 1967) (dictum); United
States v. Marshall, 463 F.2d 1211, 1212 (5th Cir. 1972); see Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. Rlv. 865,
879 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Guilty Plea Bargaining].
47. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935

(1965).

48. Id.
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may be, the accused is subjected to a subtle but powerful influence. .

.

.

A plea entered upon a bargain agreement between

a judge and an accused cannot be squared
49 with due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Thus, unable to influence what charges shall be brought against a defendant, and barred from entering into the actual bargaining process,
the court has only the power to ensure that the rights of the defendant
are safeguarded. This protection is guaranteed by satisfying the court
that the guilty plea, no matter why it is made, is voluntary.
The New Approach-Enforcement Per Se
Recently, however, courts have begun to move away from this
voluntariness test and have begun to base their decisions on the existence of the plea bargain itself. 50 That is, once the plea bargain is
proved, the court has the duty either to insist on its enforcement or to
allow withdrawal of the guilty plea.51 In many instances the result
under either test would be the same, especially in view of the judicial
tendency to find pleas of guilty based on unfulfilled promises to be involuntarily made. The significance of the new test, however, lies in
the fact that it is an absolute judicial recognition of the existence of
plea bargaining, and that it avoids any possibility of strained interpretation occasioned by artificial speculation on the relationship between
the offered bargain and the voluntariness of the resulting plea. While
such a trend portends greater protection for defendants, the basically
informal and unstructured character of the plea bargain arrangement
still places defendants at a serious disadvantage. For this reason,
many commentators have proposed reforms of the plea bargaining process, 52 the main feature of which is generally some type of formal struc49.

United States ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y.
STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 44, at § 3.3; Informal
Opinions of the Professional Ethics Committee, No. 779, 51 A.B.A.J. 444 (1965).
But see United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308, 314 (2d Cir. 1963).
50. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Schoultz v. Hocker,
469 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. Beto, 466 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1972).
51. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971); Johnson v. Beto, 466
F.2d 478, 479-80 (5th Cir. 1972). In his concurring opinion in Santobello, Justice
Douglas went further and suggested that the defendant's preference of remedy should
be given "considerable, if not controlling, weight inasmuch as the fundamental rights
flouted by a prosecutor's breach of a plea bargain are those of the defendant, not of the
State." 404 U.S. at 267.
52. See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY, supra note 44; PRESiDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT:
The Courts (1967); Guilty Plea Bargaining, supra note 46; D. NEWMAN,
supra note 13. The proposed amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure includes an extensive "Plea Agreement Procedure" designed to eliminate the
problems caused by the lack of structure surrounding plea bargains. 52 F.R.D. 409,
415 (Prelim. Draft 1971).

1966); see
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ture, including recording of the plea in open court.5 3 Until such time as
these reforms are instituted, however, the primary administration of the
plea bargaining process will remain with the prosecutor. The judiciary
will only be able to exercise that limited control afforded by its supervisory powers,54 and the potential for abuse will remain.

Form and Function of Immunity Agreements
The history of immunity agreements, unlike that of plea bargains,
has been rife with litigation. Statutes granting immunity from prosecution in return for incriminating testimony have existed in the United
States since 1857,rr and the courts have been faced with the task of interpreting such statutes ever since.5 6 Prior to 1954, all such statutes
were self-executing, 57 immunity being automatically obtained whenever a witness testified in a proceeding covered by an immunity act.
Thus, in order to escape prosecution a criminal merely had to arrange

to testify regarding his past criminal activity; the immunity acts barred
any future prosecution.
The legislative response to such automatic immunity came in 1954.
Fearful that the lack of procedural safeguards too often resulted in
Congress in that year adopted an immunity
"immunity baths," '
59
provision which included several requirements which had to be met
before immunity could be granted. These fundamental requirements
are now considered conditions precedent to a grant of immunity; with53. To date, only one state has unequivocally required that all plea bargains be
disclosed to the court. See People v. West, 3 Cal. 3d 595, 477 P.2d 409, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 385 (1970). However, at the federal level, the Fourth Circuit has suggested an
expansion of the Rule 11 inquiry designed to apprise the judge of any promise made
to the defendant. See Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988, 993 (4th Cir. 1972). Such a
procedure is also recognized by the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and
Administration of Justice which has made the following recommendations: (1) "If a
negotiated agreement to plead guilty is reached, care should be taken by prosecutor and
defense counsel to state explicitly all its terms"; and (2) "Upon the plea of guilty in
open court the terms of the agreement should be fully stated on the record and, in serious or complicated cases, reduced to writing." THE CHALLENGE OF CRUME IN A FAEE
SocmET, supra note 4, at 136.
54. See text accompanying notes 109-113 infra.
55. See Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 155.
56. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
57. See, e.g., Act of Sept 21, 1922, ch. 369, § 6(b), 42 Stat. 1002; Act of
June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 409(i), 48 Stat. 1097; Act of Sept. 21, 1950, ch. 967,
§ 10(d), 64 Stat. 883.
58. "Since the unfortunate experience of the first Immunity Act in 1857, much
has been said of the so-called 'immunity bath' by the mere fact of testifying. That
such an evil must be avoided at all costs is self-evident." H.R. REP. No. 2606, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 3064 (1954) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 2606].
59. Act of Aug. 20, 1954, ch. 769, § 1, 68 Stat. 745.
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out them, the grant is considered void.60 Since any analysis of modem procedure regarding immunity grants must necessarily include a
discussion of these requirements, treatment of them at the outset will
serve to focus the investigation.
The Formal Requirements
In cases before a grand jury or a court, the United States attorney
must first determine that the public interest will best be served by immunizing the witness. This determination then must be submitted to
the attorney general, and he, in turn, must approve it. Finally, there
must be a showing that the crimes under investigation-that is, the
ones to which the application relates-are among those to which immunity is available, as specifically authorized by statute. Once these
three conditions are met, the court must issue an order compelling the
required testimony. Not until this time is a grant of immunity in order, and only then may a witness be compelled to testify against himself.
The effectiveness of this four-part statutory prerequisite to immunity lies in the fact that three different people are involved, each of
whom must make an independent determination of the circumstances
surrounding the proposed grant of immunity. 61 At the outset, the
U.S. attorney must determine whether the public interest is best served
by granting immunity from prosecution to a witness or by attempting
to proceed to trial. In making his determination, the prosecuting attorney will most likely consider such factors as the probability of conviction, the magnitude of the offense, and the culpability of the witness in relation to all others who may be involved. 62 The attorney
general focuses on substantially the same considerations, weighing the
evidence of the witness' possible involvement against the likelihood
that the information he may reveal will ultimately be of greater significance than his conviction. It can be assumed that where the proof and
punishment of an offense may be difficult because all witnesses or leads
are somehow involved in the crime, the application for immunity
generally will be approved. 63 However, where the U.S. attorney proposes to grant immunity to a witness when the evidence against him
strongly suggests his possible involvement in a serious crime, or where
it appears that the witness has little information of importance to impart,
the application for immunity should be denied by the attorney gen60. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 317 F. Supp. 792 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
61. See Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1075 (9th Cir- 1972) (dealing
with 18 U.S.C. § 2514); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 317 F. Supp. 792, 795 (E.D.
Pa. 1970); cf. In re Bart, 304 F.2d 631, 634 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
62. See Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1972).
63. Cf. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2281 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
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eral. 64 Thus, from the outset, there is built into the statute a system
of safeguards whereby the ostensible detachment of the attorney general is allowed to serve as a check on the authority of an overzealous
prosecutor.
Once the application for immunity has been approved by the attorney general, it is channeled to the court which seeks to determine,
upon careful analysis of the application, whether or not the crimes involved are covered by the terms of the statute. Significantly, this is
the only determination the court is authorized to make; 65 in ruling on
an application for immunity, the court is "confined to an examination
of the application. . . for the purpose only of deciding whether or not
the application meets the procedural and substantive requirements of
the authorizing statute.""0 The court is thus precluded from inquiring
into the assertion that the testimony being sought is necessary to the
public interest, 67 this determination having already been made by two
members of the executive branch of government. This division is in
keeping with the doctrine of separation of powers, since the grant of
immunity initially involves the prosecutor's discretion to determine for
what crimes, if any, a defendant will be tried. 68 By limiting the
judge's role to one of determining whether the application for immunity complies with the provisions of the statute, the legislature
has clearly avoided the possibility of judicial encroachment into executive powers. However, it is important to note that where the procedural and substantive requirements have not been met, the judge is obligated to deny the immunity order.
Preservation of the Fifth Amendment Privilege:
Transactional Versus Use Immunity
Before a witness can be compelled to testify against himself under
a grant of immunity, he must have claimed his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It is reasoned that if a witness testifies voluntarily, he waives his privilege against self-incrimination and
thereafter may be tried for any crime which he might reveal.6 9 The
purpose of the immunity statute is to compel testimony from an un64. See Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 1972).
65. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431-34 (1956); In re Russo,
448 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1971); United States v. DiMauro, 441 F.2d 428, 437 (8th
Cir. 1971); cf. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 317 F. Supp. 792, 796 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
66. Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1073 (9th Cir. 1972).
67. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1956); In re Shead, 302
F. Supp. 569, 570 (N.D. Cal. 1969).
68. See text accompanying notes 45-49 supra.
69. London v. Patterson, 463 F.2d 95, 97 (9th Cir. 1972); cf. United States v.
Escandar, 465 F.2d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194,
206 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969).
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willing witness; where no Fifth Amendment privilege is raised, compulsion is unnecessary. Further, by claiming his privilege, the witness
puts the investigating body on notice that "a serious and important
decision has been placed upon them. There is then the opportunity
to acquire the necessary background and facts upon which to predicate
a wise decision as to whether or not immunity should be granted.""0
Thus, the witness' claim of privilege serves to delineate clearly those
areas which he feels may incriminate him and avoids the problems of
"automatic" immunity which might arise if he gave revealing answers
to questions which the interrogating authority had no way of knowing
might be incriminating.
When immunity from prosecution is granted, the privilege against
self-incrimination is not waived; instead, "the privilege is preserved by
the immunity granted."' 7 1

Since the privilege against self-incrimina-

tion operates only as a protection against the legal consequences of
conduct (i.e. the punishment), where the possibility of punishment
has been removed, there is no longer any basis upon which to invoke
the privilege. 72 In short, a grant of immunity from prosecution supplants a witness' Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination and renders such protection unnecessary.
For this reason, courts have been unanimous in declaring that the
scope of the protection offered by an immunity statute must be coextensive with the witness' privilege against self-incrimination. 7 3 Unfortunately, application of this principle has been considerably more
difficult than mere declaration;7 1 from earliest times the courts have
been faced with the task of determining whether the requisite scope of
protection is offered by "transactional" or "use" immunity.
The distinction between the two forms of immunity rests on
what effect the compelled testimony has on future prosecutions, a distinction which has been characterized as follows:
The phrase "use immunity" is shorthand used to describe a statute under which the grant of immunity to the witness guarantees
only that his testimony (or other information derived from that
70.

H.R. REP. No. 2606, supra note 58, at 3064.

71. Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384, 387 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 935 (1970).
72. Cf. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 431 (1956). The Court in
Hale v. Henkel formulated this concept in slightly different terms: 'The interdiction
of the Fifth Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to . . . expose
him[self] to a criminal charge. But if the criminality has already been taken away,
the Amendment ceases to apply." 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
73. See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); Counselman v.
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
74. Compare Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972), with Counselman
v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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testimony) will not be used against him in any future criminal
prosecution. Use immunity statutes do not, however, prohibit future criminal prosecutions. If independent evidence of guilt is
found by the government, the witness can be tried and convicted
of the crime about which he was questioned under the grant of
immunity. Transactional immunity statutes, on the other hand,
grant an absolute immunity from any future prosecution for crimes
about which the witness is quesarising from any 7transaction
5
tioned and testifies.

Counselman v. Hitchcock: The Origin of TransactionalImmunity

The question of the proper scope of immunity statutes was first
considered by the Supreme Court in the case of Counselman v. Hitchcock. 7 6 There, the protection of an immunity statute 7 was tested and

found constitutionally defective.
vided:

In relevant part, the statute pro-

[No] evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of a
judicial proceeding . . . shall be given in evidence, or in any
manner used against him. . . in any court of the United States,
in any criminal proceeding, or for the enforcement of any penalty

or forfeiture ....78
In analyzing the statute, the Court found it to be clearly insufficient to supplant the witness' privilege against self-incrimination, but
in so doing it set out what appear to be two different bases of decision.
The broadest interpretation, and the one most commonly cited as the

holding of the case, seems to require full transactional immunity. 79

The second standard, articulated earlier in the opinion, appears to indicate that the statute was too narrow only because it did not guard

against the derivative use of the compelled testimony.80

For most

75. United States v. Cropper, 454 F.2d 215, 216 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd,
406 U.S 952 (1972).
76. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
77. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 37.
78. Id. § 860.
79. "We are clearly of [the] opinion that no statute which leaves the party or
witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating questions put to him,
can have the effect of supplanting the privilege [against self-incrimination] conferred
by the Constitution of the United States .... In view of the constitutional provision,
a statutory enactment, to be valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates." Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 585-86 (1892) (emphasis added).
80. "[The statute] could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony
to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him or his property, in a
criminal proceeding .... It could not prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses and evidence which should be attributable directly to the testimony he might
give under compulsion, and on which he might be convicted, when otherwise, and if he
had refused to answer, he could not possibly have been convicted." Id. at 564. This
same standard is enunciated again later in the opinion: "Section 860 ... affords no
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practical purposes, however, any confusion engendered by the Counselman decision"' was cleared up by amended statutory language which
specifically required that immunity extend to "any transaction, matter,
or thing" concerning which a witness may testify. 82 Such language was
specifically included in most major federal immunity statutes prior to
1970,83 and these statutes consistently
withstood constitutional attack
84
on grounds of inadequate protection.
Kastigar v. United States: The Emergence of Use Immunity

In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act s '
which included an immunity provision requiring only use immunity. 6
Previously, the proper scope of immunity had been presumed to be full
transactional immunity, and early cases dealing with the new provision found it to be constitutionally defective."s However, in Kastigar
v. United States,8 s the United States Supreme Court reversed this trend
and found the protection offered to be sufficient, declaring that
"[t]ransactional immunity . . . affords the witness considerably broader
protection than does the Fifth Amendment privilege.""8
protection against the use of compelled testimony which consists in gaining therefrom
a knowledge of the details of a crime, and of sources of information which may supply
other means of convicting the witness or party." Id. at 586.
81. Compare Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 455 (1972), with In re
Korman, 449 F.2d 32, 35 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd 406 U.S. 952 (1972). See generally
id. at 34-37.
82. E.g., Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443 (emphasis added). "The act
is supposed to have been passed in view of the opinion of this court in Counselman v.
Hitchcock ......
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 594 (1896).
83. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2514 (to be repealed effective Dec. 15, 1974); Act of
Aug. 20, 1954, ch. 769, § 1, 68 Stat. 745; Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 409(i)
48 Stat. 1064.
84. See, e.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956) (Act of Aug. 20,
1954, ch. 769, § 1, 68 Stat. 745); Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384 (9th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 935 (1970) (18 U.S.C. § 2514); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 352 F.2d 921 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965) (upholding the
constitutionality of Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 652, § 409(i), 48 Stat. 1064).
85. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified in various
titles of the United States Code).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1973 Supp.). This section provides: "[N] testimony or
other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case ....
"
87. See United States v. Cropper, 454 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S.
952 (1972); In re Korman, 449 F.2d 32 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 952 (1972);
In re Kinoy, 326 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). But see Stewart v. United States,
440 F.2d 954 (9th Cir. 1971), afI'd sub noin. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972) (upholding the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 6002).
88. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
89. Id. at 453.
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Explaining that an immunity provision need only be as broad as
the Fifth Amendment privilege it displaces, the Court held:
Immunity from the use of compelled testimony, as well as evidence
derived directly and indirectly therefrom, affords this protection.
It prohibits the prosecutorial authorities from using the compelled
testimony in any respect, and it therefore insures that the testimony cannot lead to the infliction of criminal penalties on the
witness. 90
Thus, so long as a prosecutor can affirmatively establish an independent
source for information leading to the conviction of a person previously
compelled to testify about crimes for which he is subsequently convicted, the conviction will be upheld.
In upholding the constitutionality of use immunity, the Kastigar
court relied heavily on the earlier decision of Murphy v. Waterfront
Commission.91 There, the question before the Court was whether the
scope of a state immunity statute was unconstitutionally narrow since
it did not prohibit the witness' later prosecution under federal law.
Holding that "the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination
protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as
state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as well
as federal law," 92 the Court in Murphy articulated the constitutional
rule as follows:
[A] state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which
may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him ....
[I]n order to implement this constitutional rule and accommodate
the interests of the State and Federal Governments in investigating
and prosecuting crime, the Federal Government must be prohibited from
making any such use of compelled testimony and its
fruits. 93
The significance of the Murphy decision has been interpreted in
two distinct ways. One view holds that it gave general approval to the
limited scope of protection offered by use immunity provisions, and it
is on this interpretation that the Court in Kastigar appears to have
relied.9 4 The other is that Murphy in no way narrowed the necessary
scope of protection required by the Fifth Amendment, but rather that
it expanded the protection by barring the use of compelled testimony
even in jurisdictions which may never have contemplated immunity. 95
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
406 U.S.

Id.
378 U.S. 52 (1964).
Id. at 77-78.
Id. at 79.
406 U.S. at 458.
See United States v. Cropper, 454 F.2d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'd,
952 (1972).
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In one respect, however, there is agreement between the two interpretations: the direct or indirect use of compelled testimony in any
jurisdiction is absolutely prohibited.
As a necessary corollary of this prohibition, a prosecutor attempting to convict a defendant for crimes about which he previously gave
testimony under a grant of use immunity must be able to prove affirmatively that the evidence on which the conviction is based has a
source wholly independent of the prior testimony. 6
This total prohibition on use provides a comprehensive safeguard,
barring the use of compelled testimony as an "investigatory lead,"
and also barring the use of any evidence obtained by focusing
97
investigation on a witness as a result of his compelled disclosures.
Only when the prosecutor has met this heavy burden of proof will the
conviction be allowed to stand, for only then can the defendant be
said to be left in "substantially the same position as if [he] had claimed
his privilege....
The Carter Decision-A Case of Misplaced Reliance
By compelling a person to testify under a grant of immunity, the
investigating body is able to obtain critical information which might
otherwise be unavailable due to its potentially incriminating nature.
Such information is vital to the work of grand juries and congressional
investigating committees.9 9 Through a negotiated plea of guilty, the
prosecutor is able to ensure a conviction, 10 0 thereby eliminating the burdens of a jury trial and consequently disposing of the case in the most
efficient manner.' 0 ' Furthermore, such agreements allow for the individualization of the criminal justice process and the amelioration of potentially harsh punishments.' 0 2 Thus, beyond the fact that each is a
necessary procedure frequently used to aid in the task of effective law
enforcement, plea bargains and immunity agreements appear to bear little relationship to each other, either in form or function. It is for this
reason that the hybridization of the two concepts raises such serious
problems and leads to the ultimate question of whether a prosecuting
attorney, acting alone, should ever be deemed to have made an enforceable grant of immunity.
96.

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972); Murphy v. Waterfront

Comm'n. 378 U.S. 52, 79 n.18 (1964).
97. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972)
98. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 (1964).

(footnote omitted).

99. See H.R. REP. No. 2606, supra note 58, at 3059.
100. See Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
101. See generally Guilty Plea Bargaining,supra note 46, at 865.
102. See D. NEWMAN, supra note 13, at clis. 7 and 8. See also the discussion in
the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 52 F.R.D.
409, 424-25 (Prelim. Draft 1971) and the authorities cited therein.
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The Supreme Court first resolved this issue in United States v.
Ford,10 3 a case which is factually similar to Carter. In that case, the
prosecuting attorney promised to withhold prosecution of all but one offense if the defendant would agree to give testimony incriminating his
accomplices. The defendant complied, and the prosecutor subsequently
attempted to institute charges against him. The defendant pleaded
the earlier promise as a bar to the subsequent prosecution, and a judgment was rendered in his favor. On appeal, the Supreme Court held
that although the general rule was that "if an accomplice, when examined as a witness by the public prosecutor, discloses fully and fairly the
guilt of himself and his associates, he will not be prosecuted for the
offense disclosed,"'1 4 such cooperation did not create an absolute bar to
prosecution, 05but rather "merely an equitable title to the mercy of the
executive.'
Following Ford, a number of lower federal courts refused to
overturn convictions obtained after promises of immunity had been
made by prosecutors or other governmental officials. 10 6 In each case,
the reason given was the same: in the absence of statutory authority,
no binding agreement could be made. While this principle was recognized in Carter,17 the court nonetheless reached a contrary result,
placing its emphasis on the honor of the government and the defendant's reliance. The promise of immunity was therefore found enforceable. In so holding, the court relied heavily on United States v.
Paiva,0 8 a case which appears to offer substantial authority for the decision in Carter but which, in reality, stands for a different principle of
law.
The Supervisory Power of the Court
In Paiva, a U.S. attorney promised the defendant that if he would
plead guilty to four specific charges and cooperate with the government in administratively closing other cases then pending against him,
he would not be prosecuted for any of these other crimes. Paiva
agreed, on the condition that he would not be required to inform on his
103. 99 U.S. 594 (1878) (also known as the "Whiskey Cases").
104. Id. at 595.
105. Id. at 596.
106. See, e.g., Hunter v. United States, 405 F.2d 1187, 1188 (9th Cir. 1969);
Huerta v. United States, 322 F.2d 1, 2 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 954
(1964); United States v. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 225 F.2d 394, 397 (7th Cir. 1955), vacated, 355 U.S. 233 (1957); District of Columbia v. Buckley, 128 F.2d 17, 20
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 658 (1942).
107. 'We recognize . . . that ordinarily immunity in the federal system may be
granted only with the approval of the court pursuant to express statutory authorization."
454 F.2d at 427.
108. 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969).
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accomplices. As a result of this agreement, Paiva pleaded guilty to
four felonies and gave information to the Secret Service relating to the
other crimes. When the Secret Service pressed him for information concerning his accomplices, however, Paiva refused to testify; an indictment
issued as a result of this refusal.
In dismissing the indictment, the Paiva court dealt primarily with
the issuance of the improper and retaliatory indictment. Noting that
"[o]n other facts it has been held that the judiciary may exercise
supervisory powers which affect the executive," 1°9 the court stated:
[W]hen the conduct of an officer of the executive branch becomes
enmeshed in the judicial process, the courts have the power and
resulting duty to supervise that conduct to the extent it uses the
judicial administration of criminal justice. 110
The court's dismissal of the indictment was not the result of a desire to
enforce the prosecutor's promise of immunity, but rather of the need
to "deter blatant government misconduct.""' This type of "supervisory immunity" is well recognized in many areas of the law, 1 2 and
is probably the primary control the courts have over potentially abusive conduct by members of the executive branch. That immunity
from prosecution was the effect of the remedy offered in Paiva should
not necessarily be taken as indicative of a policy in favor of upholding
prosecutorial immunity agreements; such immunity is solely the result
of the court's refusal to sanction the government's misconduct (the retaliatory breach of the agreement), and is in no way dependent on the
particular facts of the case. That is, the "immunity" here arises solely
as a necessary consequence of the court's exercise of its supervisory
powers and not as a means of specifically enforcing the prosecutor's
promise. Because the immunity offered is not dependent on the promise made to the defendant, the scope of such immunity extends only to
the use and derivative use of the testimony, for such a prohibition
is sufficient to ensure the protection of the defendant's rights. Were
the court to offer more extensive protection, it would no longer merely
be exercising its supervisory power, but instead would be actually
granting immunity itself, a step which it is clearly unauthorized to
13
take.1
109. Id. at 746.
110. Id.; cf. Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
111. United States v. Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742, 746 (D.D.C. 1969), quoting
Dixon v. District of Columbia, 394 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
112. See, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967) (prohibitig arrests made to harass workers in a voter registration drive); Williamson v. United
States, 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965) (prohibiting
testimony of a contingent fee informer). It is important to note that in each of these
cases, the defendant was guilty. In these instances, the guilt or innocence of the defendant is considered of secondary importance to the necessity for supervision.
113. United States ex rel. Berberian v. Cliff, 300 F. Supp. 8, 13 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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It is for this reason that the Carter court's reliance on Paiva as authority for enforcing the immunity agreement is faulty. In the Carter
decision, there was no discussion of potential government misconduct, although Carter alleged that the prosecution in Virginia was initiated only after he "refused further cooperation with a Secret Service
Agent who was annoyed at the manner in which the F.B.I. had handled the case."' 14 There is no indication in the opinion, however, that
his refusal to testify was justified or that the agent's questioning was
beyond the bounds of Carter's agreement. If no such misconduct is
present, the court has no legal basis on which to exercise its supervisory
power, and any attempt to enforce the agreement must be based on
principles applicable to the enforceability of plea bargains. Carter, in
fact, appears to have been decided on plea bargaining principles, thereby
establishing a novel-and potentially dangerous-precedent.
More Than a Plea Bargain
A significant distinction has developed in the evolving law of plea
bargains: bargains involving promises to drop charges, promises to recommend leniency, and promises to charge lesser included offenses at
the trial stage are treated quite differently than promises involving immunity from prosecution. Although this distinction may initially have
been grounded in the early prohibition of binding prosecutorial grants
of immunity found in Ford,"5 subsequent questioning of the soundness
of that case" 6 suggests that there must be a more compelling basis of
differentiation.
In the first place, the prosecuting attorney is unable to make a
binding promise of leniency or charge reduction."17 In either case,
he submits his proposal to the judge, who is then free to accept or reject
it. (This does not mean, of course, that the prosecutor cannot make a
binding promise. On the contrary, he may promise to recommend leniency or reduction of charges, and this promise is specifically enforceable between the parties to the agreement.)"I 8 Thus, in these types of
bargains, there is built into the procedure a safeguard to protect both
the defendant and the government from an unwise agreement on the
part of the prosecutor. In the agreement not to prosecute, however,
there is no such protection, since this is a matter solely within the
discretion of the prosecuting attorney.
Secondly, in the former type of agreement, the gravamen of the
114. 454 P.2d at 427.
115. 99 U.S. 594 (1878).
116. See United States v. Paiva, 294 F.Supp. 742, 745 (D.D.C.1969).
117. For a discussion of the ramifications of this procedure, see D.
supra note 13, at 97-98.
118. Gallegos v. United States, 466 F.2d 740, 741 (5th Cir. 1972).

NEwMAN,
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defendant's promise is the waiver of his Sixth Amendment rights, a
waiver which is easily remedied in the event of a breach by the prosecutor by a withdrawal of the guilty plea and a new trial on the merits.
In the immunity situation, the defendant waives not only his Sixth
Amendment rights, but is required to testify in lieu of claiming his Fifth
Amendment privilege. The remedy in case of a breach in this situation
is not so easily fashioned:1 19 to withdraw the guilty plea is impossible
since the defendant has already incriminated himself, yet to deem the
promise binding ignores the dangers which originally led to the formulation of the statutory safeguards surrounding "normal" grants of immunity
and allows the prosecutor to do indirectly that which he cannot do directly. Therefore, although there appears to be a definite trend in
modem courts to enforce plea bargains when made, it is apparent that
this policy extends only to bargains involving waiver of Sixth Amendment rights, and not to those which include the waiver of Fifth Amendment rights as well. By extending this policy to include nonstatutory
prosecutorial grants of immunity, the Carter decision clears the way for
increasing noncompliance with the safeguards embodied in the immunity statutes and virtually eliminates the protection they offer.
The Jurisdictional Issue
Even assuming arguenda that Paiva stands for the proposition
that immunity from prosecution plea bargains are binding and enforceable per se, the court should have distinguished Carter on other
grounds. In Paiva, the agreement was breached in the same judicial
district in which it was made; in Carter, separate districts were involved.
Dismissing this as "a distinction without a difference,"' 2 9 the majority
in Carternoted:
The United States government is the United States government
throughout all of the states and districts. If the United States
government in the District of Columbia . . . promised that the
sole prosecution against defendant would be the misdemeanor
charge in that jurisdiction . . . we will not permit the United
States government
in the Eastern District of Virginia to breach the
21
promise.1
While there is no question that the "United States government is the
United States government throughout all of its states and districts," it
is equally clear that Congress specifically limited the duties and authority of the United States attorney to the judicial district to which
he was appointed. 1 22 Further, the U.S. attorney "in a particular dis119. This problem was explicitly recognized by Judge Boreman in his dissent in
Carter, although he did not attempt to offer a solution. 454 F.2d at 431.
120. Id. at 428.
121. Id.

122.

28 U.S.C. § 547: "[Elach United States attorney, within his district, shall
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trict represents the United States in that district and nobody else could
be given that authority... ."12 Given such clear declarations of a legislative intention to prohibit one U.S. attorney from acting beyond
the bounds of his own district, the Carter court's rationale for ignoring that principle is unconvincing.
Reinforcing the proposition that a prosecuting attorney is the
spokesman for his own district, the United States Supreme Court in
Santobello v. New York 124 recently held that a promise made by one
attorney in a state prosecutor's office will be binding on all prosecutors
within that office. Noting that "[t]he staff lawyers in a prosecutor's
office have the burden of 'letting the left hand know what the right
hand is doing' or has done,"1 25 the Court refused to allow a prosecutor
to make a sentence recommendation to the judge in breach of an earlier agreement made with the defendant by another prosecutor, irrespective of the fact that the second prosecutor was wholly unaware of
the agreement and that there was strong evidence that that judge would
have imposed the maximum sentence on the defendant anyway. In
Giglio v. United States,' 26 the Court was presented with a similar problem in the federal context, and it was held that a promise made by one
member of the office was binding on all members equally:
The prosecutor's office is an entity and as such it is the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one1 27attorney must
be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government.
Although these are the first cases to bind a third person to a negotiated plea agreement, they must not be seen as sanctioning an extension of the powers of the prosecuting attorney, but rather as
mere corollaries of the doctrine which limits such authority to the
prosecutor's own district. That is, although the U.S. attorney is
limited by statute to acting only for the judicial district in which he
serves, once he undertakes to act he becomes the spokesman for his
entire office. It is important in this respect to note that in both Santobello and Giglio, the third person bound by the agreement was a representative of the same judicial district to which the powers of the origi.... " (emphasis added); see Ex parte Wilson, 62 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Tex. 1945);
cf. United States v. Winston, 170 U.S. 522, 524 (1898).
123. Ex parte Wilson, 62 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Tex. 1945); see Kelly v. United
States ex rel. Frad, 89 F.2d 866, 869 (2d Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Frad v. Kelly,
302 U.S. 312 (1937).
124. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
125. Id. at 262.
126. 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
127. Id. at 154; cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 272 (1957): "Mhe
liability of a principal is affected by the knowledge of an agent concerning a matter
as to which he acts within his power to bind the principal or upon which it is his duty
to give the principal information."
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nal prosecutor extended. In neither case is there any language to indicate that the Court would sanction an extension beyond the original
prosecutor's own jurisdiction. On the contrary, each Court based its
decision in part on the fact that the prosecutor's office should be
seen as a unified whole which can assume the burden created by the
Court's ruling through the creation of "procedures and regulations...
to insure communication of all relevant information on each case to
every lawyer who deals with it."1' 2 s This statement strongly suggests
129
that, as a practical matter, further expansion would be impossible.
Santobello Distinguished
For these reasons, the Carter court's characterization of the Santobello decision as "additional support for the result we reach"'1 30 is
somewhat confusing. Not only is Santobello distinguishable in that the
breach of the agreement was committed in the same district in which
the agreement was made, but the agreement in question was also a
straightforward plea bargain with none of the additional problems
raised by a promise of immunity. Even before Santobello, there was
no question that the prosecutor had the power to make such agreements;
and the Carter court's reliance on Santobello was appropriate only if it
was dealing with the District of Columbia agreement in terms of traditional plea bargain notions. This conclusion also explains the basis
on which the court felt competent to dismiss the Virginia indictment.
As stated in Santobello, there are two types of relief available to the defendant when a bargain is breached: withdrawal of the guilty plea or
In each case, the relief afspecific performance of the promise.'
forded must be based on the totality of circumstances surrounding the
agreement. Since withdrawal of the guilty plea is impossible once
incriminating testimony has been given, the only possible remedy in
Carter would be specific performance of the promise, i.e. full transactional immunity. Unfortunately, for the reasons set out above,
neither the underlying principles nor the remedy espoused in Santobello is applicable to the facts presented in Carter; thus, the court's
reference to that case as authority for its overly broad remedy is singularly inappropriate.
It cannot be denied that Santobello is the most far-reaching decision in the field of plea bargains, and that it could conceivably be inter128. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
129. While such an undertaking may be possible within one prosecutorial office.
the feasibility of such communication becomes increasingly remote as the bounds of
the Court's statement are extended beyond these confines. Thus, to the extent that
the Court's holding is based on this rationale, construction of the cited language to
include jurisdictions other than the prosecutor's own seems highly unsound.
130. 454 F.2d at 429.
131. 404 U.S. at 263.
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preted as sanctioning the enforceability of all plea bargains, including
those involving promises of immunity from prosecution. Even if this
were the case, it is still clear that such promises are enforceable only to
the extent of the prosecutor's power to make them in the first place.
Thus, while the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Carter might have been
able to make a binding grant of immunity from prosecution in the District of Columbia, an attempt to go beyond those geographical bounds
and to prohibit prosecution in the Eastern District of Virginia would be
in direct violation of his statutory authority. Similarly, it would be an
unwarranted assumption of the powers of the Virginia prosecutor
which the court would simply be unauthorized to permit. Indeed, even
in In re Kelly,'3 2 a recent decision which cites Carter and which appears to favor the enforceability of prosecutorial promises of immunity,
the court based this part of its ruling on the fact that such immunity
33
"derives from inherent prosecutorial discretion as exercised dafly."'
Since, as has already been discussed, 34 such discretion does not extend
beyond the limits of the prosecutor's jurisdiction, by implication this
statement confines the court's holding to the prosecutor's own district.
Thus, it does not represent the judicial expansion of the prosecutor's
powers effectuated by the Cartercase.
Although this precise issue had never been decided previously in
the federal courts, an analogous situation has arisen twice at the state
level. 3 ' In each case, the question was whether an immunity agreement made by a state attorney in one judicial circuit could be held
binding on another judicial circuit within the state. After reviewing the
statutory limits of the prosecutor's powers, each court held that the
agreement was not binding, as the attorney had no power to make
such an all-encompassing agreement: "[The state attorney] had not
the authority of the state as a prosecuting officer, outside of his own
jurisdiction (except in matters originating therein), either to speak or
act for the state."' 36 Following similar reasoning, the agreement in
Carter could be enforced, if at all, only to prohibit prosecution in the
District of Columbia; and since this issue never arose, the court had no
authority to enforce the agreement at all. The decision of the Carter
court to uphold the agreement anyway, in spite of the specific statutory
limitations and case law to the contrary, is unprecedented and seems to
warrant a more thoughtful discussion than the mere conclusory statement that "[tihe solution does not lie in formalisms about the express,
132. 350 F.Supp. 1198 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
133. Id. at 1200.
134. See text accompanying notes 122-123 supra.
135. See Stancel v.Schultz, 226 So. 2d 456 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969); Allers v.
State, 144 Md.75, 124 A. 399 (1923).
136. Allers v.State, 144 Md.75, 80, 124 A. 399, 400 (1923).
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implied or apparent authority of one United States Attorney . . . to
bind another United States Attorney.
The Scope of the Agreement
Having established that the scope of any agreement made by the
District of Columbia prosecutor had to be restricted to crimes originating in his own district, it remains to be seen whether the crimes involved in the Virginia prosecution could be so characterized. If so, and
if Santobello and Paiva require enforcement of all immunity from
prosecution agreements, then the decision of the Carter case is correct, albeit poorly reasoned. Unfortunately, there is some disagreement about this aspect of the case; the majority indicated that there
was some connection between the crimes, whereas the dissent insisted
that they were "separate and wholly different."' 38
If the nature of the crimes is investigated, it quickly becomes
apparent that there was no connection between the Viriginia forgeries
and the sale in the District of Columbia. Since the Virginia prosecution was based on checks forged prior to the $156,000 sale in the District of Columbia, it is physically impossible that the same checks could
have been involved. Further, since the Virginia crimes preceded the
crime committed in the District of Columbia, it is likewise impossible
that the crimes for which Carter was prosecuted in Virginia could have
originated in the District of Columbia. Indeed, the only connection
between the crimes is that they all involved stolen government checks
bought by Carter in one lot. This connection is far too tenuous to
require that the crimes be characterized as having arisen in the District
of Columbia. Hence, the problem arises in this case not because the
Virginia court attempted to institute an unauthorized prosecution, but
because the defendant unfortunately relied on an overbroad and wholly
unauthorized agreement.
Even assuming that the Assistant U.S. Attorney had the power to
make such a sweeping grant of immunity, sufficient to cover all possible crimes arising from the checks which Carter had purchased,
there is doubt expressed in the case as to whether he actually did so.
The sworn statement of Carter's counsel in an affidavit was that the
prosecutor promised Carter "that [he] would not be prosecuted anywhere else for anything having to do with the stolen checks,"' 39 an allegation he attempted to prove by pointing to the fact that an F.B.I.
agent who participated in the plea negotiations, upon learning of the
Virginia prosecution, termed it " 'unfair' in the light of the previous
137.
138.
139.

454 F.2d at 428.
Id. at 431. See note 10 & accompanying text supra.
454 F.2d at 427.
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agreement."' 4 0 Without further discussion of this point, the court
concluded that "[i]f the promise was made, relied upon and breached as
."I"
*.".
The dissent,
alleged, the indictment should be dismissed .
however, quoting from the record at the hearing on Carter's motion
to dismiss the indictment, effectively showed that no such broad agreement was expressly made, and correctly assessed the problem as centering on the fact that "while the scope of the agreement reached
during the plea bargaining was never precisely delineated,"' 4 2 Carter's counsel "understood" that it reached all of the crimes arising from
all of the stolen checks.
If the intention of the majority was to uphold the bargain based
on the understanding of Carter (or his counsel) alone-an issue
which, as the dissent points out, the majority opinion does not
reach' 4 3 -it is nonetheless clear that such an understanding would have
to be based upon some reasonable grounds. That the existence (and,
by analogy, the scope) of a bargain must be determined by objective
standards has recently been given explicit expression by the Fifth
Circuit:
[P]lea bargaining must have more substantiality than mere expectation and hope. It must have explicit expression and reliance
and is measured by objective, not subjective, standards. 4 4
In assessing the reasonableness of the reliance, one important
factor is the likelihood that the bargain could be consummated as
made.14 Thus, a defendant cannot rely on a promise by a prosecutor to reduce a sentence 46 or on inaccurate representations made to
him by his own attorney.147 Similarly, in the usual case, an experienced
counsel would not presume the unequivocal power of a prosecuting attorney to prohibit prosecution in another judicial district. This fact,
coupled with the possibility that the scope of the agreement was never
given explicit expression, raises doubts as to the reasonableness of Carter's reliance in this case. Therefore, even barring the problems of authority or jurisdiction raised by the case, it is quite likely that the
agreement could not withstand attack on grounds of reliance.
140. Id. at n.1.
141. Id. at 428.
142. Id. at 430.
143. Id. at 431.
144. Johnson v. Beto, 466 F.2d 478, 480 (5th Cir. 1972) (emphasis added); cf.
United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd on other
grounds, 377 U.S. 463 (1964).
145. See United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1971).
146. See Hailer v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857, 858 n.1 (1st Cir. 1969); United States v.
Lester, 247 F.2d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1957).
147. See Holland v. United States, 406 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1969).
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Sununary

Looking at the case as a whole, it is clear that the court in
Carter could have arrived at its decision only by making at least three
assumptions:
1. That a prosecutorial promise of freedom from prosecution
can be enforced on principles relevant to other types of plea bargains.
2. That such a promise, even if enforceable in its own jurisdiction,
could be extended to include prosecutions in other districts.
3. That the particular promise in this case was sufficiently explicit to warrant enforcement; or, in the alternative, that the defendant's understanding of the promise was reasonably susceptible of
such broad interpretation.
Not only is each of these assumptions highly questionable in itself,
but their effect is cumulative; i.e., each requires the full acceptance
of the preceding assumption before it, in turn, can be accepted.
Thus, by the time the court reached the final step, the validity of the
entire premise was weakened threefold. Significantly, the court never
confronted any of these issues directly, and the important questions
they raised were dismissed in the most offhand manner. In sum, this
decision represents a policy decision based on the realization that to
reach any other conclusion would be manifestly unfair to a cooperative defendant. It also gives explicit recognition to the fear that allowing a second prosecution might adversely affect the willingness of future defendants to be similarly cooperative:
There is more at stake here than just the liberty of this defendant.
At stake is the honor of the government, public confidence in the
fair administration of justice, and the efficient
administration of
1 48
justice in a federal scheme of government.
An Alternative Solution
The desire of the Carter court to reach a solution which would
serve the ends both of this particular defendant and of the "fair administration of justice" is certainly understandable. However, even if the
agreement here was not susceptible of analysis in terms of more traditional plea bargain principles, and even if the prosecutor had no authority to make the agreement he did, the fact remains that the bargain
was made and that Carter relied on it, whether reasonably or not, in
incriminating himself and others. While enforcing the agreement itself
is unwise for the reasons previously discussed, merely holding that the
prosecution was powerless to make such an agreement and, thus upholding the Virginia conviction, presents an equally intolerable situation.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Boreman recognized the gravity
148.

454 F.2d at 428.
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of this problem,'149 but erroneously concluded that Carter's only remedy was to move for a reduction of his sentence or to apply for executive clemency. These remedies are clearly inadequate, for neither
provides any assurance that Carter would not be forced to spend time
in prison as a result of his cooperation with the District of Columbia
officials. What is needed is a solution which would achieve the result reached by the majority, while not engendering the problems occasioned by its imprecise reasoning. It is submitted that if the court
had viewed the agreement in terms of immunity principles rather than
plea bargain notions, such an answer could have been found.
In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,150 discussed above, 15' the
Supreme Court held that a witness testifying under a state statutory
grant of immunity would be absolutely protected from a later federal
prosecution based on the use of that "testimony or its fruits." Significantly, this holding was not based on any statutory (legislative)
power of the state to prohibit such use, but rather on purely constitu52
decided immediately
tional grounds. The case of Malloy v. Hogan,1
Amendment was
Fifth
of
the
protection
the
that
held
prior to Murphy,
of the Fourclause
process
due
the
via
prosecutions
state
applicable to
in Murphy
decision
the
teenth Amendment. Under this reasoning,
in
Adams v.
articulated
As
was necessarily and correctly reached.
53
him from
to
protect
statute
any
Maryland, "a witness does not need
the use of self-incriminating testimony he is compelled to give.....
The Fifth Amendment takes care of that without a statute.' 54 The
effect of the Murphy decision was thus to create an exclusionary rule
based on the Fifth Amendment, analogous to similar rules of evidence
based on violations of the Fourth Amendment, which operates as a
complete bar to any use of the compelled testimony by any jurisdiction.
The applicability of Murphy to the situation in Carter lies in the
fact that the exclusion was constitutionally required. Since the "immunity" granted was not based on any statute, the fact that the prosecutor originally had no power to make such a binding promise is irrelevant; the court had the supervisory power to prohibit the use of the
tainted evidence. Further, the very fact that the prosecutor's promise
was unauthorized presents an even more compelling argument for prohibiting its use at a subsequent trial: since the initial grant of immunity
149. "It is entirely possible that an entirely equitable judicial solution may not be
found on the facts of this case." Id. at 431.
150. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
151. See text accompanying notes 91-98 supra.
152. 387 U.S. 1 (1964).
153. 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
154. Id. at 181. It should be noted that although the initial choice of whether or
not to make the bargain is voluntary, once the bargain is made, the defendant is
compelled to testify to all matters within the scope of the bargain.
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was unauthorized, the testimony itself was compelled in derogation of
Carter's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. There
is little doubt that the court has not only the power, but the duty, to
suppress any evidence acquired in violation of a defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights, 1 5 and the Murphy decision specifically extends this
holding to prohibit the use of testimony obtained as a result of an immunity agreement.
Applying this exclusionary rule to the facts in Carter, it becomes
evident that the Virginia prosecution was conducted in violation of
Carter's privilege against self-incrimination. It is undisputed in the
opinion that the Secret Service agent conducting the Virginia investigation gained access to the information given by Carter to the F.B.I.
His statement that the evidence used to convict Carter "was gained
substantially independent of the statement furnished to the F.B.I. by
the defendant"'1 6 is clearly insufficient to meet the "heavy burden of
proof" required under the Murphy decision and reiterated in Kastigar.'5 7 Similarly, the statement in the dissenting opinion that "it is
apparent that independently-gathered evidence would, and did, lead the
Secret Service to Carter"'15 8 is not persuasive in view of the indications
to the contrary to be inferred from the agent's testimony.
It is important to note that under the Murphy rule, the judicial
"immunity" conferred is only use immunity. Thus, had the evidence
obtained by the Virginia agent been in fact independent, and had he
been able to prove this to the satisfaction of the court, the trial would
have been proper. To reach any other conclusion, a court would have
to ignore both the function of the rule adopted in the Murphy decision
and the limitations imposed on the power of the court to uphold immunity grants.
The primary purpose of the exclusionary rule propounded in
Murphy was to preserve the witness' privilege against self-incrimination while not impairing the ability of the second jurisdiction to carry
out law enforcement and investigatory activities. Prohibiting any subsequent use of compelled testimony achieves this objective. Further,
the court is authorized to uphold an attempted grant of transactional
immunity only when specific statutory requirements have been met.159
In the absence of such requirements, there is no authority on which
the court is empowered to act. However, when the basis of the
"immunity" offered is an evidentiary ruling, which the court is clearly
authorized to make, no such problem arises. As long as the court re155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

See United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966).
454 F.2d at 427 n.2.
See text accompanying notes 96-98 supra.
454 F.2d at 430.
See text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
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stricts itself to a determination of the evidentiary question, i.e. the use
of the previously compelled testimony, no objection may be made that
the court has exceeded the bounds of its authority.
In Carter, it seems probable that had the tainted evidence been
suppressed, the defendant would never have been convicted. If this
is true, then Carter was entitled to relief in the form of a dismissal
of the indictment. Significantly, this basis of decision allows for a
more liberal interpretation of the facts than does the opinion of the
court: whereas the latter requires proof of the scope of the promise
made (and, presumably, proof that Carter's "understanding" of a
sweeping promise was "reasonable") before the indictment will be dismissed,160 the exclusionary rule operates irrespective of the scope of the
promise made to the defendant. Thus, even if the District of Columbia
prosecutor had promised Carter immunity from prosecution for crimes
arising out of activities in that district alone, any testimony given as
a result thereof would have been subject to the exclusionary rule and
absolutely barred from use in a subsequent proceeding. In the instant
case, the operation of the exclusionary rule would seem to require the
dismissal of the indictment, while a standard based on proof of the
existence and scope of the prosecutorial promise might or might not
yield the same result.
Conclusion
The decision of the court in United States v. Carter gave effect to
two major exceptions to previously well-established principles of law:
enforcement of a promise made by a U.S. attorney in one jurisdiction
which, by its terms, bound a U.S. attorney in a second jurisdiction;
and rejection of the necessity of fulfilling strict statutory requirements as
a prerequisite to a grant of immunity. In each instance, the exception
arose not from a positive desire on the part of the court to change the
law; rather, each was the result of inexplicit reasoning and an apparent
failure on the part of the court to contemplate the consequences of its
decision. More fundamentally, these exceptions were necessitated by
the court's assumption that the facts in Carter required specific performance of the alleged promise made to the defendant. Thus, the
problems arise in this case primarily because of the court's failure
to recognize the inapplicability of plea bargaining principles to the
more complicated factual situation presented by the terms of the agreement between the prosecutor and the defendant.
Before rejecting such exceptions outright, however, it is important to consider their effect on future criminal prosecutions; if they
work a substantial positive good, they can be justified on the basis of
160.

454 F.2d at 428.
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sound public policy, albeit not clarity of judicial thought. Unfortunately, however, these holdings do not withstand such scrutiny: these
exceptions, if followed, place serious obstacles in the path of effective
law enforcement and portend a significant limitation on the scope of
protection necessary to supplant a witness' privilege against self-incrimination.
One sound justification for limiting the jurisdictional authority
of the individual U.S. attorneys is to facilitate the orderly administration of justice by preventing a random and, thus, uncontrollable, system of enforcement of criminal laws. By allowing for the appointment
of particular individuals within specifically designated geographical
areas to serve as U.S. attorneys for those areas, the legislature established a centralized system of prosecutorial authority over which both
supervision and control could be effectively exercised. Further, the
limited jurisdictional authority of the U.S. attorney presumably ensures
that his discretionary powers, when exercised, will be influenced by
the totality of relevant circumstances, including his special perception
of local conditions. By extending the scope of this authority, the
court in Carter ignored any such pragmatic considerations in the interests of what it felt to be sound public policy. In so holding, however,
the court also usurped a clear legislative function by allowing a redefinition of the authority of the U.S. attorney in opposition to that specifically delineated by statute.
Of even greater potential harm is the failure of the court to invalClearly, to uphold such
idate the unauthorized immunity grant.
grants leaves the door open for the creation of a very permissive and
basically unsupervised immunity procedure and subjects the government to the full panoply of abuses existent prior to the 1954 requirements. Equally deleterious, however, is the effect that such a procedure
might have on future defendants. From the witness' standpoint, the
purpose of the statutory requirements is to ensure that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is safeguarded absolutely. By giving the informal immunity agreement the full force and effect of the statutory grant,
the court allows for an alternative situation whereby a witness might be
compelled to give incriminating testimony under circumstances in
which he could not otherwise be constitutionally compelled to do so."'
Thus, this decision, though seemingly based on equitable principles,
161. The potential harm here arises from two sources. First, the defendant
cannot be assured that the court will recognize the informal immunity grant at all.
Secondly, since the testimony given is "voluntary" in the sense that the defendant
initially had the option of accepting or rejecting the terms of the proferred plea bargain, there exists the possibility that a court might view the Fifth Amendment privilege
as waived, rather than supplanted, thereby allowing the use of such testimony in subse-

quent prosecutions.
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could, in fact, have precisely the oppositQ effect of promoting the
violation of a defendant's rights.
The unsoundness of this aspect of the holding is further emphasized by the fact that the court was clearly unauthorized to take
such a step. The limitations of the court's power to uphold immunity
agreements is strictly confined to those situations in which the grant is
formally proper. The court's action here, in direct opposition to those
limitations, is a judicial infringement on the power of the executive
(the attorney general) to approve all proposed grants of immunity, as
well as a violation of a specific legislative mandate.
This note has attempted to suggest an alternative solution to the
problems presented in Carter which is both legally sound and socially
desirable. Had the court in Carter based its decision on an evidentiary ruling prohibiting the use of compelled testimony in any subsequent proceeding, it could have, within its own authority, adequately
protected the defendant's rights while not engendering the possibility
of an unwarranted limitation of the protection offered by the Fifth
Amendment or establishing an undesirable interference with the effective functioning of law enforcement. Beyond this the court is not
authorized to go, and any attempt to do so risks judicial encroachment
into executive or legislative powers.
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